Hong Kong Agreement

The persistent sense of historical injustice, which is part of China`s official position on Hong Kong, helps explain the persistent differences and misunderstandings that have plagued Sino-British negotiations in the territory in recent years. Many Chinese officials have long been wary of British intentions, including fears that the British will deprive Hong Kong of their wealth when they leave or use the territory to undermine the People`s Republic and its values. These under-currents became particularly evident when, in 1992, Hong Kong`s last British governor, Chris Patten, began reforms aimed at introducing some degree of popular representation into the colony`s governmental institutions. For the Chinese authorities, these changes constituted, at best, a breach of previous agreements between the two sides in order to allow a smooth transition to Chinese domination or, in the worst case, an attempt to enter Chinese politics after 1997 to subversive elements. The Chinese government`s determination to stop implementing reforms after 1997 reflects the fact that it does not feel compelled to abide by unacceptable political agreements reached by illegitimate foreign occupiers on Chinese soil. 23The benefit is, however, lower than expected, at least partly because of the difficulties in applying CEPA on the continent. The Chinese authorities stated that they had made the most legislative costs: 26 of the 29 texts that had to be amended for the entry into force of CEPA had been amended and the legislative and regulatory work should have been completed by mid-2004. However, the implementation of the agreement remains problematic: the procedure is complex and opaque, and decisions are subject to the bureaucracy of the central government and then to the arbitrariness of the local authorities. Pressure from Hong Kong authorities and business circles has simplified procedures (e.g. .B. in Shanghai and Guangdong, where only one office has been set up to process CEPA permits), but the number of administrations operating in some sectors is very high. Finally, CEPA is no exception to the rule that, in China, a number of irregular obstacles tend to replace legal obstacles that have been abolished or relaxed.

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